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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                          
No. 06-4570 
____________
RICHARD P. by and for Rachel P., and DENISE L., by and for Kristina L., 
Appellants
vs.
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF ERIE, PENNSYLVANIA; 
JANET WOODS, individually and in her capacity as Principal of 
Strong Vincent High School; LINDA L. CAPPABIANCA, individually 
and in her capacity as Assistant Principal of Strong Vincent High School*,
*(Amended pursuant to Clerk’s Order of 1/19/07)
____________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civ. No. 03-390 ) 
District Judge:   Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
November 1, 2007
Before:   RENDELL, WEIS and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
         Filed: November 19, 2007
____________
OPINION 
                              
2WEIS, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et. seq., against the School District of the City of
Erie, Pennsylvania, and the principal and assistant principal of Strong Vincent High
School, Janet Woods and Linda L. Cappabianco respectively.  The two female student
plaintiffs alleged that defendants failed to stop them from being continually harassed by
other students.  The District Court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment on the
pleadings with respect to the § 1983 claims against the individual defendants.  
The remaining claims under Title IX were tried to a jury.  After a six-day
trial, the Court submitted special interrogatories to the jury, inquiring whether the school
district “had actual knowledge of the harassment of plaintiff[s] . . . by other students after
the December 19, 2001 rapes.”  The jury answered “No.”  As a result, the District Court
entered judgment for defendants on the plaintiffs’ Title IX claims.  A motion for a new
trial was denied and plaintiffs appealed.
Plaintiffs contend that the District Court’s charges to the jury on “actual
knowledge” and the effect of untruthfulness were erroneous.  We have reviewed the
instructions and conclude that they did not contain reversible error.  The district judge’s
refusal to adopt the text of the plaintiffs’ points for charge and his decision to use the
Court’s version was not error.  See Posttape Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 537 F.2d
751, 757 (3d Cir. 1976).  The jury instructions “taken as a whole, properly apprise[d] the
jury of the issues and the applicable law.”  Limbach Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l
3Ass’n, 949 F.2d 1241, 1259 n.15 (3d Cir. 1991).
Plaintiffs assert that defense counsel made statements during his closing
argument that prejudiced plaintiffs to the extent that a new trial is required.  We do not
agree.  Although some of the remarks were quite spirited, they did not cross the line into
impermissible territory.  See Forrest v. Beloit Corp., 424 F.3d 344, 351 (3d Cir. 2005) (a
new trial will be granted for improper statements of counsel only where it is “‘reasonably
probable’ that the verdict was influenced” by the prejudice the statements caused.)
We also conclude that the District Court did not err when it granted the
defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to the plaintiffs’ § 1983
claims for violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights.  The District Court correctly
concluded that, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims were subsumed by their
Title IX claims.  See Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779, 789 (3d Cir.
1990).  Further, the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are undermined by the jury’s finding of fact
that there was no basis for the Title IX claims.  
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
